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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore and analyse the dynamic relationship between
remittances inﬂows of Egyptians working abroad and asymmetric oil price shocks.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to explain the
impulse response functions (IRFs) and the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). The rationale
behind using these tools is its ability to examine the dynamic effects of our variables of interest.
Findings – The impulse response functions conﬁrmed that remittance inﬂows have various responses to
asymmetric oil price shocks. For instance, inﬂowing remittances increase in response to positive oil price
shocks, while it decreases in response to negative oil price shocks. Also, the results indicate that the responses
are signiﬁcant in the short and medium-run and insigniﬁcant in the long run. The magnitude of these
responses reaches its peak or trough in the third year. Further, the variance decomposition reveals that oil
price decreases are more inﬂuential than oil price increases.
Originality/value – This means that remittances inﬂows in Egypt are pro-cyclical with oil price shocks.
That explained by the fact that more than one-half of those remittances sent from GCC countries where real
economic growth is very pro-cyclical with the oil prices. This empirical assessment will help policymakers to
determine the behaviour of remittances and highlights the impact of different kinds of oil prices shocks on
remittances. Unlike the little existing literature, this study is the ﬁrst study applied the VAR model using a
novel dataset spanning 1960-2016.
Keywords Remittances, Oil price shocks, Egypt, VAR modelling
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In recent years, international migration is becoming a sharply increasing global trend. The
international migrants’ numbers increased from 175 million in 2000 up to 258 million in
2017, according to the United Nations. It means a 47 per cent increase compared to 2000.
This increasing trend of migration is accompanying by a steady increase in money transfers
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from migrants to their families in home countries, so-called remittances (Asatryan et al.,
2017).
Goldberg and Levi (2008) refer to remittances as capital transfers from one country to
another made by migrants who stay abroad for more than one year. Remittance ﬂows have
attracted much attention in research and policies applications because of their scale and
properties (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006). According to the World Bank, inﬂowing
remittances to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) reached $529bn in 2018 and are
likely to reach $550bn in 2019. That massive size of remittances motivates governments all
over the world to pay focused attention to remittances and to analyse its behaviour as high
policy interest (IMF, 2009).
Besides its massive size, remittance ﬂows are stable and less volatile than other sources
of external ﬁnancing for developing countries such as private capital ﬂows and foreign
direct investment (Vargas-Silva, 2006; Beck and Peria, 2011). That makes inﬂowing
remittances to have substantial development impacts. For instance, it helps to reduce
poverty and increase income prospects for households. That, in turn, inﬂuences the
household’s consumption and savings behaviour. So, the better remittances are understood,
the better policies and regulations will be designed (Veeramoothoo, 2009).
For Egypt, remittances are of vital economic importance. It is a primary stable source of
foreign currency for the economy namely the US$ and an external source of ﬁnancing.
Unlike the signiﬁcant decline in all sources of foreign currency since the ﬁnancial crisis in
2008 and the 2011 revolution, remittances inﬂows have increased signiﬁcantly rising from
$8.3bn in 2009 to $18.3bn in 2014 with a more stable pattern than FDI and foreign aid.
According to the IMF and World Bank, in 2016, remittances inﬂows to Egypt from the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)[1] states were US$16.6bn, and it was representing 4.8 percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) in Egypt. Thus, remittances compensate for the sharp drop
in foreign currency sources.
However, the stability of inﬂowing remittances in Egypt is a critical issue that needs a
regular investigation for two reasons. First, remittance ﬂows to the MENA region driven by
inﬂows to Labour Abundant countries (Farzanegan and Hassan, 2016). That makes Egypt
the top recipient of remittances in the MENA region. Second, the Egyptian economy is
dependent on remittances inﬂows which mainly sent from the Gulf region. The largest
source of remittance ﬂows from GCC oil-exporting rich-countries exceed 70 per cent of total
remittance inﬂows to Egypt and accounts for around 5 per cent of its GDP in recent years. In
these countries, the population is less, and the economic activities are highly dependent on
oil rents. So, the substantial economic spillovers of global oil price changes likely include
signiﬁcant effects on remittances. Hence, oil prices shocks can affect the steady trajectory of
remittances inﬂows in Egypt.
Despite the importance of remittances, little research exists on the relationship between
oil price and inﬂowing remittances. In the literature, there are mixed results. Most of the
studies ﬁnd that remittances react positively to oil price shocks. While others showed a
negative or insigniﬁcant relationship between oil price and remittance ﬂows. They used
different methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, instrumental variables
(IV) estimations and vector error correction models (VECM).
This paper examines the response of remittances inﬂows in Egypt to asymmetric oil
price shocks. It contributes to the current literature on oil prices impacts on remittances in
two ways. First, we apply a VARmodel to explain the impulse response functions (IRF) and
the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). Second, it uses a novel dataset spanning
1960-2016 on Egypt. The ﬁndings will help policymakers to determine the behaviour of
remittances and highlight its sensitivity to various oil price shocks.
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The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review the existing literature that covers
the relationship between remittances and oil prices. Section 3 shows an overview of
workers’ remittances inﬂows in Egypt. Section 4, we discuss the data and methodology.
Then in Section 5, the empirical ﬁndings and policy implications are presented. Finally,
Section 6 summarises the conclusions.
2. Literature review
This section discusses the theoretical background and presents the relevant literature
concerning remittances and oil price shocks. In particular, this section segmented into two
parts. In the ﬁrst part, we outline and discuss the theoretical underpinnings relative to
remittances and oil price shocks. While the second part reviews the most recent literature
related to the context of this study.
2.1 Theoretical model
The theoretical dimensions are best described by Vargas-Silva (2006) and Hagen-Zanker
and Siegel (2007). They discussed the determinants of remittances and covered the
motivations to remit, while Sonmez (2016) analysed the different effects of oil price shocks.
In this section, ﬁrst, we identify the determinants of remittances. Second, we discuss the
macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks by explaining two theoretical economic tools: IS-
LM model and the supply-demand framework. Finally, we analyse the transmission
channels through which oil price shocks can affect remittances inﬂows.
2.1.1 The determinants of remittances. The fundamental theory of the new economics of
labour migration presents many determinants of remittances. At the micro-level, low
money-transfer costs are likely to account for the bulk of unexplained remittance growth
(Beck and Peria, 2011; Canas et al., 2007; Hagen-Zanker and Siegel, 2007). Also, the number
of migrants plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the volume of remittances. Moreover, the
causes of migration, migrant’s labour market earnings level, the strength of their bonds to
the home country and the time spent at the destination consider signiﬁcant determinants of
remittance behaviour (Niimi et al., 2009; Canas et al., 2007; Hagen-Zanker and Siegel, 2007).
Other determinants are remitter characteristics such as gender, age, education level, marital
status, where spouse lives, number of children, earnings per week, have a bank account, has
health insurance andmigration cost (McCoy et al., 2007).
On the macro-level, there are many factors that affect the volume of remittances such as
the economic situations in the origin and the host countries, the interest rate, the ratio of
expatriates to population, institutional quality, and the real exchange rate (Singh et al., 2009;
Faini, 1994; Rana and Hashmi, 2015). For instance, any devaluation or appreciation of host
countries currency can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the inward remittances. Moreover, the
ﬁnancial sector development positively affects the remittance inﬂows (Singh et al., 2009).
Further, there are other factors including the migration of highly skilled workers, consumer
price index, age dependency ratio, political rights, government expenditure, population and
unemployment (Rana and Hashmi, 2015; Veeramoothoo, 2009; Gupta, 2006). Therefore, we
can ﬂexibly justify the choice of the selected variables in our empirical model in the next
section by referring to Singh et al. (2009).
2.1.2 The macroeconomic eﬀects of oil price shocks. There are different types of oil price
shocks deﬁnitions. Net Oil Increase Model (NOI) is an oil price shock that refers to the
difference between the current oil price and the maximum prices in the past 4 years or 12
quarters (Hamilton, 1996). If that difference is positive, then there is price volatility, but if the
difference equals to zero, then there is no price volatility. It means that Net Oil Increase
Model mainly concentrates on the volume of change and how signiﬁcant are the changes in
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oil prices by looking at the net oil price changes over a one-year and three years. However,
other asymmetric deﬁnitions distinguish between positive and negative oil price changes
(Hamilton, 1983; Mork, 1989; Farzanegan and Markwerdt, 2009). They deﬁned oil price
changes, where (roilpt) is the log of real oil price in time t, as follows:
Droilpþt ¼ max 0; roilpt  roilpt1ð Þð Þ (1)
Droilpt ¼ man 0; roilpt  roilpt1ð Þð Þ (2)
Furthermore, another form of non-linear transformation of real oil prices uses the percentage
change over the previous year’s maximum. For example, how much the oil price of the
current quarter exceeds the value of the preceding four quarters’ peak (Hamilton, 1996).
noilpþt ¼ max 0; roilptð Þ max roilpt1ð Þ; . . . ; roilpt4ð Þð Þð ½ (3)
noilpt ¼ min 0; roilptð Þ min roilpt1ð Þ; . . . ; roilpt4ð Þð Þð ½ (4)
Also, there are other types of oil price shocks coming from decomposing ﬂuctuations in oil
prices into three components: an oil supply shock, a global oil demand shock, and a
precautionary oil-speciﬁc demand shock (Kilian, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, an oil price shock is
either a positive shock or a negative shock. A positive shock means a sharp, unexpected
increase in oil prices while a negative shock refers to an unanticipated drop in oil prices. For
instance, a negative oil supply shock refers to three consequence declines in oil supply. The
oil price increase is up to a point related to supply shortage while the causes of oil price drop
segmented into two parts. First, supply is outpacing demand due to new oil exporter
countries and oil shale production. Second, simultaneous oil demand decreases because of
the slowdown in the growth of the global economy and the growing trend towards
sustainable clean alternative energy.
In brief, we will discuss two main theoretical economic tools intuitions: (IS-LM)[2] model
and the supply–demand framework. First, the IS-LM model explains the theoretical
dynamics of how exogenous oil price shocks affect the output in an oil-importing economy.
A production function, with three inputs: capital, labour and oil as an exogenous variable,
explains the effects of oil shocks. Positive oil price shocks lead to exogenous increases in
imports that shift the IS curve to the left and cause decreases in GDP. That is not only due to
the decline in consumer’s expenditures but also because of the reduction of public and
private spending on planned investment.
In the case of positive oil price shocks, on the ﬁscal policy side, the government reduced
taxes and increased its spending to increase consumer’s disposable income. So, the IS curve
will partially shift to the right to offset the output deterioration. Therefore, an increase in
government spending has a positive effect on the output as the Keynesian, and standard
neoclassical models predict (Sonmez, 2016). While on the monetary policy side, the central
bank action will depend on inﬂation expectations. It can intervene by increasing the money
supply that in turn shifts the LM curve to the right to stimulate aggregate demand in a try to
increase output. Thus, an oil price increase will make the industry and production process of
goods costlier, and that produces a recession (Finn, 2000).
Second, the framework of supply and demand side effects became another mechanism
that explains the impact of oil price shocks on other macroeconomic variables (Adebiyi et al.,
2009). The impact of oil price shocks depends on whether the source of oil price ﬂuctuations
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originates from an oil supply shock, a global aggregate demand shock or an oil-speciﬁc
demand shock (Kilian, 2009a, 2009b). The combined impact of supply and demand could
lead to higher inﬂation and reduced real output (Ran et al., 2010). As for the supply side, an
oil supply increase implies that if the oil goes down, then the output should go up. However,
if an oil increase brings about a recession, then an oil price decline should induce an
economic boom and vice versa. For instance, an exogenous negative oil supply shock will
lead to lower productivity; thus directly the output will be reduced.
On the demand side, an oil price increase reduces the purchasing power of consumers. It
makes a substitution of consumption and aggregate demand dropping. That will increase
the overall price level, given the Keynesian assumption of rigid wages and will reduce
employment. That is due to the reduction in real output because producers will be motivated
to substitute less energy intensive capital for more energy intensive capital (Ran et al., 2010).
In contrast, an oil price decline is expected to produce an economic boom (Hamilton, 2003).
2.1.3 How oil price shocks theoretically aﬀect remittances inﬂows. Oil price shocks
theoretically affect remittances outﬂow in oil-rich countries through two transmission
channels (Figure 1). The ﬁrst channel is concerned with the effects of oil price shocks on
output, investment, and consumption (direct effect). The second transmission channel is
concerned with oil price effects on inﬂation and unemployment. It investigates whether
changes in real oil prices transmitted through real government spending impact
unemployment. Thus, that in turn impact remittances outﬂows from host countries (indirect
effect).
On the one hand, oil price shocks in host countries affect foreign worker’s remitting
behaviour through its direct impact on consumption, investment, and production. The
consumer prefers precautionary savings behaviour because oil price shock causes economic
uncertainty that leads to a reduction of consumer conﬁdence. Consequently, the real
investment will decrease in the short and medium-term due to uncertainties about
investment proﬁtability. Also, the ﬁnancial investment may also be affected depending on
the degree of risk preference which dominates the ﬁnancial market at the time of oil price
shock. Further, oil price shocks cause a decline in the output in response to the consumer
demand decrease. Thus, theoretically, all these effects negatively impact remittances.
On the other hand, oil price shocks likely to leave output constant in many cases by
raising the ﬁnal prices of goods. The impact of oil price shocks on inﬂation depends on the
outcome from the contradicted deﬂationary pressures created by decreasing consumer
demand and inﬂationary pressures created by the increasing prices of goods. In the same
way, oil price shock’s effects on unemployment subject to counterbalancing forces
generated from both a decrease in production and inﬂation increase. Hence, the higher
Figure 1.
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inﬂation and unemployment rates, the fewer remittances outﬂow from host countries to
home countries. Theoretically, economies should experience steeper recessions in response
to positive oil price shocks and smaller expansions in response to adverse oil price shocks
that in turn will affect remittances outﬂow negatively and positively, respectively.
2.2 Empirical literature
A large body of literature exists on the determinants of remittances from one side, and the
relationship between oil price shocks and macroeconomic variables from the other side.
However, there is less work that investigates the relationship between oil price shocks and
remittances. Not only that but also there is a controversy in the literature on whether oil
price has a positive or negative effect on remittances (Table I). All of that makes us claim
that the impact of oil price shocks on remittances has not sufﬁciently investigated.
There is a strand of literature ﬁnds that remittances react positively to oil price shocks.
From one side, few studies focused on inﬂowing remittances to recipient oil-importing
countries (Makhlouf and Kasmaoui, 2017; Mohaddes and Raissi, 2013; Morshed and Pitaﬁ,
2008; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006). In the case of Morocco, Makhlouf and Kasmaoui (2017)
show that there is a positive cointegration relationship between shocks in crude oil price and
remittances inﬂows for the period 2004-2010 using ordinary least squares OLS and IV
regressions, and VECM. Oil price rise leads to a decline in local purchasing power; as a
consequence, migrants send more remittances to assist their families. However, there is no
relationship in the short run. Also, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) ﬁnd that remittances in Sri
Lanka are positively correlated with oil prices, offering a hedge against oil shocks.
Furthermore, Morshed and Pitaﬁ’s (2008) results suggest that the dynamic, positive oil
price shocks have accompanied with an increase in inﬂowing remittances. That positive
remittance effect partially mitigates the consequent reduction in output. Mohaddes and
Raissi (2013) argue that oil price booms have an indirect positive effect on the GDP due to
more signiﬁcant foreign inﬂows such as remittances in Jordon. That indirect positive effect
dominates the direct negative effect in the form of increases in the import bill due to higher
oil prices.
On the other side, De et al. (2019) concluded that remittance ﬂows to remittance-
dependent countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka react positively to increases in oil
prices and it modestly falls following oil price decreases. Also, they mentioned that the
remittance outﬂows for migrant workers who work in the non-oil sector are elastic to oil
price changes. In the short run, the elasticity is between 0.5 and 0.8 while in the long-term it
Table I.
The relationship
between oil price on
remittances
Positive Negative No evidence
Authors
(Makhlouf and Kasmaoui, 2017)
remittances inﬂows to Morocco
(Khodeir, 2015)
remittances inﬂows to Egypt
(Naufal and Termos, 2009)
remittances outﬂows from GCC
(De et al., 2019)
remittances outﬂows from GCC
(El-Sharabassy, 2008)
remittances inﬂows to Egypt
Statistically insigniﬁcant
(Ratha and Mohapatra, 2009)
remittances outﬂows from GCC
(Mohaddes and Raissi, 2013)
remittances inﬂows to Jordon
(Morshed and Pitaﬁ, 2008)
remittances inﬂows to oil-
importing countries
(Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006)
remittances inﬂows to Sri Lanka
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is between 0.6 and 1.1. Indeed, the non-oil sector GDP in the GCC is a crucial determinant of
remittance outﬂows because Most migrant workers in the GCC employed in the non-oil
sector. However, the oil sector GDP is a signiﬁcant driver of non-oil sector GDP. In the same
direction, in their analysis, other studies assume the positive association between oil price
and remittances such as (Asatryan et al., 2017; MoawadAhmed, 2016; Ahmed, 2013).
In contrast, two attempts have shown a negative relationship between oil price and
remittances inﬂows in Egypt using mixed analysis techniques. El-Sharabassy (2008) ﬁnds
that oil price has a negative and insigniﬁcant effect on remittances using the OLS method
over 15 years sample. However, oil revenues in single GCC countries have a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on remittances inﬂows in Egypt. It means the oil export revenues in GCC
countries strongly support economic growth, and consequently, affect remittances. While,
by using annual data on Egypt from 1980 to 2012, the estimates from the VEC model show
that remittances inﬂows negatively correlated with oil prices in the long and short run
(Khodeir, 2015). It means that remittances inﬂows increased with the decreases of oil price,
and that undermines their usefulness as a shock absorber.
There are another two critical empirical studies conﬁrmed that the correlation between
remittances outﬂows from oil-exporting countries and oil prices has no evidence. Ratha and
Mohapatra (2009) argue that there is no correlation between falling oil prices and remittance
outﬂows in the oil exporting countries in the Middle East. For instance, they reported that in
Saudi Arabia remittance outﬂows uncorrelated with oil prices in recent years. Also, Naufal
and Termos (2009) examined the elasticity of remittances from the GCC concerning the price
of crude oil. They ﬁnd that the response of remittances to changes in the price of oil is
inelastic (less than 0.5).
Finally, as discussed above, there are conﬂicting results in the literature regarding the
association between oil price shocks and remittances. From an empirical perspective, the
previous studies used a wide range of econometric techniques such as ordinary least squares
OLS and IV regressions, and VECM. However, this paper applied a VAR model to examine
the reaction of remittances to different oil price shocks. Thus, this paper contributes to the
recent research on remittances and oil price shocks.
3. Overview of workers’ remittances inﬂows in Egypt
After the 1973 war, the Egyptian Government has approved the so-called “the open door”
and trade liberalisation policy. This policy has released restrictions on migration; thus,
allowed the largest boost to outward migrant ﬂows to Libya and GCC countries. However,
the Egyptian migrants became concentrated in Saudi Arabia due to the war in Libya in
2011. Approximately 86 per cent of Egyptian expatriates resides in Arab countries; most of
them are in GCC countries with around 1.3 million in Saudi Arabia. In 2015, the total
Egyptian population abroad was representing 7.4 million compared to 1.9 million in 2000,
according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Egypt. A steady increase in remittances has
accompanied this boom in migrant outﬂows.
That makes Egypt one of the top remittance receivers in the world and the top recipient
of remittances in the MENA region, according to the IMF and World Bank. Figure 2 shows
the share of remittances in the GDP by country and remittances from GCC states as a share
of total remittances. In 2016, Egypt received the lion’s share of remittances in the MENA
from GCC countries around $16.6bn which exceed 70 per cent of its total remittances
inﬂows. That was representing 4.8 per cent of its GDP. Thus, the Egyptian economy is
dependent on remittances inﬂow that mainly sent from GCC states which are highly
dependent on oil rents.
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During the past decade, remittances inﬂows in Egypt witnessed a boom and compensated
for the sharp drop in foreign currency deposits. Egypt witnessed a decline in the Suez Canal,
tourism and exports revenues as a result of the global economic slowdown after the global
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Total exports revenues decreased, and tourism revenues gradually
declined by 67.7 per cent from their peak in 2011 (Figure 3). However, since 2009 inﬂowing
remittances signiﬁcantly increased and exceeded both foreign direct investment (FDI) and
foreign aid inﬂows (Figure 4). Thus, inﬂowing remittances to Egypt exceed aid inﬂows and
with a more stable pattern than FDI and foreign aid.
According to the Union of Arab Banks[3], the remittances sent to Egypt grew at a rate
estimated at 9.7 per cent in 2014 and 0.7 per cent in 2015. It means that remittances sent to
Egypt witnessed a decline in 2015 and this coincided with a decline in oil prices since mid-
2014. Therefore, this brings up to the question of whether the decline of oil prices negatively
impacts the remittances inﬂow to Egypt. So, it was necessary to link remittances inﬂows to
Egypt with oil prices in GCC countries and investigate the dynamic relationship between
them. Figure 5 shows that changes in oil price and changes in remittances inﬂow are moving
together with lag moves. Hence, it seems that there a positive correlation between changes in
oil price and changes in remittances.
Figure 2.
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Table II shows speciﬁc oil supply disruptions that lead to changes in oil prices at the year of
disruption and changes in remittances inﬂows to Egypt next year after a speciﬁc disruption.
We ﬁnd that the considerable VAR’s basic form; however, in the long run, these disruptions
cause both negative and positive OPEC crude oil price shocks. The interesting is that
changes in oil prices are associated and moving together with changes in remittances inﬂow
to Egypt in the year after the shock. It means a positive change in oil price followed by an
increase in remittances inﬂow to Egypt. while remittances declined in response to negative
changes in oil price due to other disruptions. Thus, even under the same kind of shocks such
as supply-side shocks, there are different effects on oil prices changes. That in turn show to
what extent oil price shocks might have asymmetric effects on remittance inﬂows to Egypt.
4. Data and methodology
4.1 Data
The data set used in this study includes the latest annual observations available for all
variables that cover the period from 1960 to 2016 in Egypt. The data mainly obtained from
four sources: the central bank of Egypt (CBE), the World Development Indicators (WDI) of
the World Bank, the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and OPEC databases. Table I illustrates the descriptive statistics of our
variables all in logs transformations. The data series and notation used in this study are as
follows: remittances inﬂows to Egypt (remit), oil price (oilp), the exchange rate (exch), money
Figure 5.
Oil price and egypt
remittances inﬂows
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
–60
–40
–20
0
20
40
Ca
hn
ge
s 
in
 R
em
i
an
ce
s
Ch
an
ge
s 
in
 O
il 
Pr
ic
e
∆ Oil Price ∆ Remiances
Source: Authors’ calculations depending on the World Bank
(WDI) data and OPEC data
Figure 4.
Sources of foreign
currency
7.52 8.21 10.45
13.83 16.45
22
29.4 25.2 23.9 26.9 25.07 26.99 26.02 22.25 18.71.82 2.24
2.85
3.31
3.56
3.82
5.16
4.72 4.52
5.05 5.21 5.03 5.37
5.36
5.12
3.2 3.8
5.48
6.41
7.21
8.21
10.89
10.56 11.66
10.63
9.42 9.75 5.07
7.37
3.77
2.89 2.96
3.34
5.02
5.33
7.66
8.69
7.15
12.45
12.59 17.97
18.67
18.52 19.33
17.08
0
20
40
60
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Bi
lli
on
s 
(U
S 
$)
Exports Suez Canal Tourism Remiances
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Central Bank of Egypt,
Annual Report Different Volumes (Fiscal year starts at the end of
June each year and ends in the same date in the next year. 2016
means FY 2015/2016)
Response of
remittances
inﬂows
supply (bm), the ratio of home GDP to host GDP (hostgdp) and domestic credit (dc). Table III
summarises the descriptive statistics.
Unit roots tests are important to know if shocks have permanent or transitory effects. We
tested the stationarity of the variables by applying augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and
Philipps Perron (PP) tests. The Unit root analysis revealed that oilp, hostgdp, exchr, dc and bm
had a unit root at level but was found to be stationary at ﬁrst difference of order 1(1) in both
models with trend and without a trend, and all series integrated of order one, as in Table IV.
Therefore, we expect the oil price shocks to have permanent effects on remittances.
As Table V shows after applying the Johansen cointegration test, there is at least three
cointegration since Trace statistic is less than Critical value. It means that there are at least three
long-run relationships between the variables. That makes analysing the IRF more interesting
because we expected to see long-run responses and the effects of oil price shocks will not die out
at least in the short andmedium run. Furthermore, one of the critical decisionswhen applying the
VARmodel is to determine the number of lags that should be included in themodel. According to
HQICwhich indicated themedian, the optimal lags for themodel is two lags.
4.2 Empirical methodology
Our vector autoregressive system is estimated in levels of six endogenous macroeconomic
variables: oilp, hostgdp, exchr, dc, remit and bm, all in natural logarithms (logs). Using
VAR’s basic form[4]: yt= (y1t,. . .., y3t,. . ..,y6t), the VAR (p)-process deﬁned as:
Table II.
Major oil events
Time (t) Event
Change in oil
crude price % (t)
Changes in remittances
inflow to Egypt % (tþ 1)
October 1956 The Tripartite Aggression – –
June 1967 Arab–Israeli War 2.26 300
October 1973 6th October War 75.45 60.32
October 1973 OPEC Oil embargo
October 1978 Iranian revolution 56.18 47.68
September 1980 Iran-Iraq War 4.47 23.62
August 1990 Iraq-Kuwait war 22.24 5.66
July 1997 South East Asian ﬁnancial crisis 7.58 9.70
September 2001 Terrorists attack 19.37 0.63
December 2002 Political unrest in Venezuela 13.30 11.36
March 2003 Invasion of Iraq
2008 ﬁnancial crisis 54.62 21.60
December 2010 The Arab Spring revolutions 27.99 13.06
December 2014 OPEC overproduction 94.56 71.5
Source:Authors’ calculations
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
of the variables (all in
logs)
Statistics oilp hostgdp exchr dc remit bm
Mean 2.627 2.454 0.325 4.354 1.443 4.216
Median 2.914 2.256 0.356 4.390 1.730 4.362
Maximum 4.695 1.943 2.04 4.708 2.679 4.578
Minimum 0.190 3.501 1.054 3.837 3.013 3.510
SD 1.408 0.501 1.145 0.258 1.204 0.354
Observations 57 48 56 51 50 51
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yt ¼ A1yt1 þ . . . : þ Ap ytp þ ut
whereAi is (6 * 6) coefﬁcient matrices for i = 1,. . ., p and the order p represents the number of
lags. Thus, we have six variables and six equations, an equation for each variable; each
equation includes p lags of each variable and one error term. An unrestricted VAR includes
all variables in each equation. As so the form of unrestricted VAR system in this study can
also be written as a VAR (1)-process:
oilp
hostgdp
exchr
dc
remit
bm
2
6666664
3
7777775
¼
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
2
6666664
3
7777775
þ A lð Þ
oilpt1
hostgdpt1
exchrt1
dct1
remitt1
bmt1
t1
2
6666664
3
7777775
þ
« 1t
« 2t
« 3t
« 4t
« 5t
« 6t
2
6666664
3
7777775
The model speciﬁcation is mainly based on Singh et al. (2009) with adjustments. In addition
to remittances (remit) and oil price (oilp), we included domestic credit (dc) as indicators for
ﬁnancial depth. Financial development induces the worker’s remittances to the home
country in the long-run (Agir et al., 2011). Moreover, ﬁnancial development has a
complementary relationship with remittances to ensure economic growth (El Hamma, 2016).
To take into account the monetary policy we have used the money supply as an instrument
Table IV.
Unit root analysis
Variables
ADF PP
Without trend With trend Without trend With trend
Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff Level First diff
oilpt 1.360 3.55*** 1.392 6.61*** 1.394 6.61*** 1.669 6.62***
hostgdpt 1.096 3.45** 0.827 3.42* 0.945 3.50** 1.621 3.16*
exchrt 0.521 4.72*** 2.565 4.69*** 0.224 4.62*** 2.123 4.58***
dct 2.259 2.289 2.618 6.03*** 2.011 6.12*** 1.892 6.12***
remitt 2.619* 7.80*** 2.046 9.26*** 2.635* 7.61*** 2.003 8.62***
bmt 2.088 4.34*** 1.405 4.65*** 1.729 4.41*** 1.053 4.65***
Notes: Using MacKinnon p-values (H0: unit root exists, we denote with *, **, *** the rejection of the null
hypothesis at a 10%/5%/1% signiﬁcance level)
Table V.
Johansen
cointegration test
results
Rank Eigenvalue Trace statistic Critical value Probability MaxEigen statistic Probability
r = 0 0.710 154.898 95.753 0.000 57.001 0.000
r# 1 0.639 97.897 69.818 0.001 46.976 0.000
r# 2 0.489 50.920 47.856 0.025 30.922 0.017
r# 3 0.179 19.997* 29.797 0.423 9.087 0.825
r# 4 0.168 10.910 15.494 0.217 8.494 0.330
r# 5 0.051 2.416 3.841 0.120 2.416 0.120
Note: *Indicates that there are at least three co-integrating equations at a 5% signiﬁcance level
Source:Author’s calculation
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of managing monetary policy. The monetary policy in home remittance receiving countries
will go up to a point affects remittances inﬂows through inﬂation and interest rate. However,
the effect of interest rate differential between home and host countries on remittances still
debated in the literature.
Again, as income in both home and host countries affect remittances, we include the ratio
of GDP in Egypt to GDP in the top host country (hostgdp) in our model. Remittances are
strongly pro-cyclical vis-à-vis sending country income (Abdih et al., 2012). Further, we added
real exchange rate (exchr) as real exchange depreciation affects remittances positively and
can explain through twomain channels. First, a real depreciation will have a positive income
effect so that remittances will be positive. Second, real exchange depreciation will lead to
more considerable demand for the home country good through standard substitution effects
(Faini, 1994). Finally, it was necessary to include a dummy variable (d) to control other
signiﬁcant shocks that might cause bias results. Identifying the dummy variable depends on
historical events based on previous studies.
For robustness check, we tried to include (Polity) variable, as an indicator of political risk
and institutions, in our model speciﬁcation instead of money supply (bm). However, the
responses of remittances to asymmetric oil price shocks have not changed. That is because
the economic factors are regularly the central emigration causes in case of Egypt (Ghoneim,
2010) and the decision to remit links to the causes of migration (Hagen-Zanker and Siegel,
2007). So, we decided to focus on other economic variables.
A critical challenging decision to apply the VAR model is the ordering of the variables.
Indeed, the Cholesky decomposition is not unique; it imposes over restrictive recursive
ordering. It means that the results for IRFs and VDCs will depend on the ordering of the
variables. A possible solution for ordering problem is to try different orderings and compare
the IRFs and VDCs for each order. However, one alternative solution is the generalised VAR
which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. Therefore, it results in one
unique solution (Pesaran and Shin, 1998).
Non-policy macroeconomic variables, such as oil price and GDP, should be ordered
ﬁrst before any policy variables, such as a money supply (Sonmez, 2016). Moreover,
non-policy variables affect other variables contemporaneously through their lagged
values. Also, policy shocks do not affect the macroeconomic variables
contemporaneously, but only with a lag (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). So, based on that
rule and from similar previous studies experiences, we chose to order the variables as
follows: oil price (oilp), GDP ratio (hostgdp), an exchange rate (exchr), domestic credit
(dc), remittances (remit), money supply (bm). For that order, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
changes by comparing Cholesky decomposition with generalised decomposition.
Therefore, we decided to rely on this order.
Precisely, we deﬁned two oil price shocks speciﬁcations. They are speciﬁed- log-
difference of nominal oil price (Hamilton, 1983) and oil price increase distinguished from oil
price decrease (Mork, 1989). Thus, annually changes of nominal oil prices, deﬁned as the
ﬁrst log difference transformation of nominal oil price is speciﬁed as:
dloilpt ¼ dlnoilpt  dlnoilpt1
where oilpt is oil price in period t, d is the ﬁrst difference, plus l is the log transformation.
Also, we distinguished oil price increases from oil price decreases, as the rationale for this
speciﬁcation lies on the observed asymmetry in the way macroeconomic variables react to
oil price changes. The oil price increase is speciﬁed as dloilpp = max (0, dloilp), while
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negative oil price changes are speciﬁed as dloilpn = max (0, dloilp). Finally, we added two
lags in themodel according to the diagnostic tests.
5. Empirical results and policy implications
5.1 Impulse response functions
Impulse response functions measure the dynamic qualitative response of remittances
inﬂows in the system to exogenous shocks in oil prices. Figure 6 shows the IRFs of
remittances after log-difference of oil price and oil price increase distinguished from oil price
decrease shocks using annual data from 1960 to 2016. The undotted line represents the
response of the current and future values of remittances (remit), and the dotted lines refer to
61 standard deviation in oil prices. These dotted lines plot the conﬁdence intervals which
have been computed via asymptotic standard errors. The magnitude of the responses is on
the vertical axis and the periods (years) after the shock are on the horizontal axis.
The IRFs show that real and nominal oil price shocks almost lead to the same positive
response in remittances. The reaction of remittances is signiﬁcantly above its initial level
Figure 6.
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during the ﬁrst nine years to innovation to oil prices. However, in the long run, this effect
does not remain signiﬁcant. Also, the response of remittances (remit) to one standard shock
to log difference oil price is positive. It is signiﬁcantly different from zero during the whole
period except for the second and tenth year. The result does not differ from Cholesky
decomposition to generalised decompositions. Thus, oil price shocks in log differences are
affecting remittances positively. That is on a signiﬁcant scale in the short run then
diminishing in the long term.
The IRFs also suggest that the response of remittances inﬂows (remit) to one standard
positive shock to oil price is positive. It is signiﬁcantly above its initial level in the ﬁrst year
and over the period from the third to the sixth year. While remittances responded
signiﬁcantly in the ﬁrst three years to negative oil price innovation, it responds positively in
the ﬁrst year and negatively in second and third years. Thus, these results reveal that the
responses of remittances to positive and negative oil price shocks are signiﬁcant in the
short-run and insigniﬁcant in the long run. Also, inﬂowing remittances increases in
response to positive oil price shocks and decreases in response to negative oil price shocks.
Finally, the magnitude of these responses reaches its peak or trough in the third year.
5.2 Variance decomposition analysis
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) is useful in assessing how shocks to
economic variables reverberate through a system. Tables VI and VII demonstrate the
variance decomposition of remittances (remit) in different VAR models that use either
nominal oil price or real oil price. They show that 13.51 and 32.20 per cent of the
variation in remittances are explained by nominal oil price after one and ﬁve years,
Table VII.
Variance
decomposition of
remittances using
real oil price
Variance decompositions of remit
Year roilp Hostgdp exchr dc remit bm
1 11.75 5.79 7.56 10.68 61.01 3.19
2 11.56 11.84 15.35 8.15 50.21 2.85
3 18.18 14.21 14.23 8.41 42.63 2.30
4 24.85 14.93 12.43 7.35 38.31 2.10
5 28.22 16.11 11.69 6.69 35.36 1.91
10 32.07 21.42 12.13 5.46 27.07 1.81
15 31.13 23.81 12.77 5.13 24.88 2.25
20 30.23 25.18 12.64 5.54 24.09 2.29
Table VI.
Variance
decomposition
analysis (VDA) using
nominal oil price
Years ahead
Variance decomposition of remittances Variance decomposition of oil price
% due to nominal oil price % due to remittances % due to oil price % due to remittances
1 13.51 73.22 100 0.00
2 15.02 57.55 96.77 0.06
3 22.77 48.46 95.66 0.12
4 29.29 42.50 94.75 0.37
5 32.20 39.49 93.78 0.83
10 34.18 32.22 91.82 1.31
15 32.73 29.86 89.76 1.24
20 31.53 28.66 89.28 1.25
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respectively. In the same manner, 11.75 and 28.22 per cent of the change in remittances
are explained by real oil price after one and ﬁve years, respectively. Therefore, these
results indicate that the effects of nominal oil price shocks and real oil price shocks are
very close to a substantial extent. Thereby, using nominal or real oil price does not
cause a signiﬁcant dispute.
As shown in Tables VIII and IX, they illustrate the variance decompositions of
remittances (remit) in response to innovations in oil price increases and decreases. Indeed,
the volatility in both oil price increases and decreases affect remittances inﬂow in the model
to varying degrees. For instance, positive oil price shocks initially account for about 10.26
per cent of the variation in remittances (remit), increasing to a share of 13.76 per cent in three
years after the shock. The negative oil price shocks account for about 5.79 per cent of the
variation in remittances after a year. That is compared to18.46 per cent in the three years
after the shock. Consequently, these results reveal that oil price decreases are more
inﬂuential than oil price increases.
5.3 Policy implications
Our prime concern is with the need to determine the behaviour of inﬂowing remittances in
Egypt. The objective of this paper is to consider how remittances inﬂows react to
asymmetric oil price shocks because it is an essential point for the oil importing countries in
general and Egypt in particular. We draw on our key ﬁndings to show that positive oil price
shocks have a signiﬁcant positive impact on remittances inﬂows to Egypt to develop the
debate in the literature. Also, the results reveal that oil price increases are more important
than oil price decreases.
Table IX.
Variance
decomposition
analysis (VDA) using
D oil price-ve
Variance decompositions of remit
Year D oil price-ve Hostgdp exchr dc Remit bm
1 5.79 3.40 10.98 5.61 74.20 0.00
2 10.47 10.26 21.27 4.87 52.83 0.29
3 18.46 10.23 20.69 10.25 40.15 0.21
4 19.34 10.28 20.68 11.98 37.43 0.29
5 21.79 9.09 19.43 13.36 35.64 0.68
10 27.81 7.06 16.52 13.09 32.51 3.01
15 27.49 9.10 15.92 13.68 30.64 3.16
20 26.71 9.99 15.47 14.82 29.87 3.14
Table VIII.
Variance
decomposition
analysis (VDA) using
D oil priceþve
Variance decompositions of remit
Year D oil priceþve Hostgdp exchr dc remit bm
1 10.26 0.84 4.31 5.17 79.42 0.00
2 9.90 4.89 16.60 4.26 64.24 0.09
3 13.76 6.59 19.24 8.10 54.21 0.08
4 15.35 7.22 19.85 8.51 48.77 0.29
5 16.46 7.07 19.59 8.69 47.89 0.28
10 17.76 6.89 16.41 9.48 47.10 0.35
15 17.49 7.87 18.74 9.53 45.94 0.43
20 16.82 8.71 19.33 10.27 44.42 0.45
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Although Egypt has a stock of heavy crude oil, it unsuitable for oil reﬁning plants in Egypt.
So, Egypt exports the heavy crude oil and imports light crude oil mainly from Saudi and
UAE, at the same time. However, total oil products imports are higher than total oil products
exports. Egypt has a deﬁcit in solar, gasoline with a high portion of octane, gas piping,
sulfur and coke. That led to a growing deﬁcit in the Egyptian oil merchandise balance
during the last decade. For instance, in ﬁscal year 2015/2016 total oil exports were US$5.7bn,
while total oil imports were US$9.3bn, causes US$3.5bn deﬁcit in oil balance[5]. That means
that oil price increases would make an additional cost that cannot be avoided. Also, Egypt
still subsidies petroleum products with net subsidies cost as well. That would put more
pressure on the public deﬁcit beside its effect on the balance of payments which needs
foreign currency, namely US$, to ﬁnance its deﬁcit and the important increasing bill. So, the
evidence of this paper suggests that Egypt can beneﬁt from the positive effect of
remittances. That is by considering remittances inﬂows as an alternative that offsets the
loss of foreign currency and may mitigate oil costs in the public budget due to oil price
increases.
Policymakers in Egypt are well advised to encourage inﬂowing remittances by the
following policy recommendations:
 increasing the numbers of migrants to oil exporting countries;
 promoting the ﬁnancial sector; and
 reducing the transaction costs.
Oil price changes have two contradictory impacts on the oil importing economies. In Egypt,
sharp oil price increases positively raise the oil exporting bills. At the same time, it increases
remittances inﬂows. The net impact mainly depends on the relative size of oil
imports and remittances inﬂows. Thus, although the positive association between oil price
increases and remittances inﬂows to Egypt, it may be the case that the net impact of oil
price increases on the Egyptian economy is negative at least in the short term. So, further
research will be needed to determine the net impact of oil prices shocks on the Egyptian
economy to come up with a good understanding of the whole picture. Also, we suggest the
researchers use bilateral data because bilateral data have not yet been studied to estimate
determinants of workers’ remittances on Egypt from Arab Gulf countries. Also, use
microeconomic level variables to improve our understanding of the different impacts of oil
shocks on remittances.
6. Conclusions
The connection between remittances and oil prices is relevant to Egypt because it is quite
vulnerable to oil price shocks. Global oil price raise directly increases the oil-import bill in
the Egyptian balance of payment. Remittances are one of the most signiﬁcant sources of
foreign currencies which build the international reserves in Egypt and used for meeting
external bills. The majority of these remittances mostly coming from GCC countries. So, one
of the substantial factors that affect GCC economies and through which remittances can be
affected is oil price.
This paper analyses the dynamic response of remittances inﬂows in Egypt to
asymmetric oil price shocks over the periods from 1960 to 2016. Using a multivariate VAR
model, we examined the impulse response function (IRF) and forecast error variance
decompositions (FEVD). Our ﬁndings indicate that using nominal or real oil price does not
cause a signiﬁcant dispute. It reveals that the responses of remittances inﬂow to asymmetric
oil price shocks are signiﬁcantly asymmetric too. Inﬂowing remittances increase in response
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to positive oil price shocks, and it declines in response to negative oil price shocks. The
magnitude of these responses reaches its peak or trough in the third year. Also, these
responses are signiﬁcant in the short and medium-run and insigniﬁcant in the long run.
Finally, the results show that oil price decreases are more inﬂuential than oil price increases.
So, these ﬁndings suggest that remittances inﬂows in Egypt are pro-cyclical with the oil
price.
In conclusion, this paper develops a debate in the literature. It contributes to the little
existing studies on the relationship between oil price and remittances. The novelty of this
paper is through applying a VAR model using new dataset spanning 1960-2016 on Egypt.
This paper has clear policy implications for determining the behaviour of remittances and
highlighting the impact of different kinds of oil prices shocks on remittances. That will help
policymakers to efﬁciently beneﬁt from the positive effect of remittances which can offset
the loss of foreign currency due to sharp oil price increases.
Notes
1. The six GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab
Emirates (UAE) States.
2. The investment saving-liquidity preference money supply.
3. The Union of Arab Banks www.uabonline.org/en/research
4. For more detailed information, refer Pfaﬀ (2008).
5. Central Bank of Egypt data, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Volume No. (242) May 2017.
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